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At first glance there may not appearto be many valid comparisons be-tween the presidential leadership
styles of Dwight Eisenhower and Abraham
Lincoln. The two men held power almost
one hundred years apart, Lincoln during
one of the greatest crises that the United
States has ever witnessed and Eisenhower,
although presiding at the height of the
Cold War, in a period of relative peace and
prosperity. In addition, Eisenhower had
gained worldwide fame as a victorious gen-
eral in World War II, which almost inevita-
bly caused the public to perceive him as a
potential president while Lincoln, who was
hardly an unknown in the Republican
party, nonetheless received the nomina-
tion as very much of a "dark horse" candi-
date. Finally, the world itself has changed
so much in the twentieth century and the
powers of the president have expanded to
such a degree, that one might suspect that
the two had very little in common.
Admittedly, an attempt to rank or com-
pare presidents is often perceived as a pre-
carious undertaking. Thus political sci-
entist Douglas Kynerd writes, "It should
be abundantly clear that the 'game' of
ranking or rating Presidents has no sys-
tematic, objective, or scientific base." And
a letter written to Robert Murray, who has
conducted recent polling at Penn State
University put the matter even more sim-
ply, "Regarding your list of Presidents.
Pfft!"
Plaque of Lincoln to commemorate
his visit to Boston in 1848.
However, a closer analysis of the two
men reveals that there are similarities in
the manner in which they approached the
office. Their solution to dealing with
people and problems is what Fred
Greenstein labeled in his classic study of
Eisenhower "The Hidden Hand Presi-
dency." Greenstein argues that
Eisenhower preferred to work behind the
scenes, relying on his Cabinet members
for front-line decisions, while he set broad
policy. An analysis of Lincoln's approach
to the process of governing reveals some
basic similarities, both in personality char-
acteristics, as well as in methods of lead-
ership, which also led to a secretive lead-
ership style.
Lincoln and Eisenhower were both by
nature reticent and secretive often mak-
ing them an enigma to those who knew
them well. Fellow lawyers, his law part-
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ner William Herndon, and his good friend
Judge David Davis, would all have agreed
of Lincoln that he was "one of the most
incomprehensible personages we have
ever known." Even his wife, Mary, once
said of her husband, "He was not a de-
monstrative man, when he felt most
deeply, he expressed the least." In
Eisenhower's case, speech writer Emmet
Hughes summing up the contradictions
in the man, including his tendency to
work behind the scenes, wrote, "He was
not, then, exactly a simple man."
Utilizing this mask of secrecy, both
men exuded a folksy and rather humble
image which hid some of their truly out-
standing talents. Lincoln has become a
figure of such mythical proportions, with
tales of his humble beginnings, that he
serves the role of the typical common man
in American history. Writing to his friend
and fellow Illinois politician, Jesse Fell, in
1859, in a letter which Fell had requested,
Lincoln said: "There is not much of it,
for the reason I suppose, that there is not
much of me." On another occasion ad-
dressing the 166th Ohio Regiment, he said
that his rise to the presidency showed that
any mother's son might aspire to that of-
fice. He also claimed that his policy was
to have no policy and that he did not di-
rect events as much as events carried him
along. The president created the impres-
sion that he drifted with the tide and that
his career was due to chance and fortu-
itous circumstances.
In reality, while he may have begun life
humbly, as most people did on the fron-
tier, by the time of his presidency Lincoln
had distanced himself from many of his
fellow citizens of Springfield. He was a
well known lawyer and a man of substan-
tial wealth who also possessed major lit-
erary talent which might have propelled
him into a writing career if he had been
born under different circumstances. Lin-
coln, who is the American public's ideal
of the common man, was anything but
common even ifhe strove mightily to con-
ceal the fact.
Eisenhower was also portrayed as com-
ing from humble beginnings. As biogra-
pher Stephen Ambrose writes, "If
_______________-----.J _
Eisenhower was not born in a log cabin,
the shack in Dennison, Texas, was close
enough; if his family was not poverty-
stricken, it was poor enough." Ambrose
further notes that until United States en-
try into World War II in 1941, Ike's career
had been extremely ordinary. In fact, "Had
he died in 1941, on the verge of retire-
ment on his fifty-first birthday, he would
not today be even a footnote in history."
Similar to Lincoln, Eisenhower's smile
and folksy manner concealed much deeper
intellectual abilities. His staff secretary,
Andrew Goodpaster, recounted how on
one occasion Eisenhower listened to sev-
eral hours of presentations by foreign
policy experts and then, himself, summa-
rized the discussions in a forty-five minute
discourse. George Kennan, noted diplo-
mat, scholar, and architect of the post
World War II containment policy, who was
one of those present, later told Goodpaster
that "in doing so Eisenhower showed his
intellectual ascendancy over every man in
the room."
While Lincoln did not have the formal
executive experience which Eisenhower
did, Lincoln's caution caused him to op-
erate in a similar manner. He, too, liked
to solicit advice from various corners, in
some cases even after he had made his
decision. Lincoln once addressed this ten-
dency in himself with the declaration "I
am a slow walker but I never walk back."
Numerous Eisenhower advisors have
verified his desire to set broad policy goals
and make big decisions while he avoided
becoming bogged down in the minutiae
of details. Attorney General Herbert
Brownell learned this the hard way when
he brought some pardons to Eisenhower
who said: "Say, listen this is your job.
You're not supposed to put all that bur-
den on me. I'm going to rely on you.
What are your recommendations?"
Brownell added on another occasion, "If
they did not bring to his attention mat-
ters that required it, he was severe. But if
they 'passed the buck' to the president for
front-line decisions, he equally disap-
proved."
Compare this with New York Times
editor Henry Raymond's description of
Lincoln's procedure: "He always main-
tained that the proper duty of each Secre-
tary was to direct the details of everything
done within his own department, and to
tender such suggestion, information, and
advice to the President, as he might so-
licit at his hands. But the duty and re-
sponsibility of deciding what line of policy
should be pursued, or what steps should
be taken in any specific case, in his
judgment belonged exclusively to the
President; and he was always willing and
ready to assume. it."
Both presidents had learned the les-
son that the head of a vast bureaucracy
such as the U. S. government will soon
lose his effectiveness and his administra-
tion will come to a screeching halt if he
becomes immersed in the details of every
department. It was only when the cabi-
net member could not handle the job that
intervention occurred, as in the case of
Lincoln's War Secretary Simon Cameron
or Eisenhower's Defense Secretary
Charles Wilson.
Lincoln and Eisenhower apparently
saw their advisors as sounding boards to
get all points of view before coming to a
decision. Andrew Goodpaster delighted in
repeating Eisenhower's quote about the
use of his cabinet: "You know I get the
best advisors I can get. I get the most
brilliant people I can assemble. I listen to
their advice and I even take their advice.
But goddammit, I don't have to like it."
Once again, the portrait drawn by Lin-
coln friend and newspaperman Noah
Brooks is striking: It was a peculiar trait
of Lincoln that, in order to preclude all
possibility of doubt in his own mind con-
cerning the expediency of any contem-
plated act, he would state to those with
whom he came in contact many doubts
and objections not his own, but those of
others, for the express purpose of being
confirmed and fixed in his own judgment.
Such tactics can lead to the perception
that the president is not in charge of his
administration. This will be particularly
true if there are dominant individuals in
the cabinet who may appear to manipu-
late the vacillating chief executive, and, of
course, Eisenhower had such advisors in
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Sherman Adams and John Foster Dulles
while Lincoln had Edwin Stanton and
Salmon Chase.
When the record is examined it be-
comes apparent that both Adams and
Dulles subordinated themselves to
Eisenhower. In his memoirs the president
wrote of his dealings with the Secretary
of State, "He would not deliver an impor-
tant speech or statement until I had read,
edited, and approved it; he guarded con-
stantly against the possibility that any mis-
understanding could arise between us."
Similarly, Chief of Staff Sherman
Adams verified that the legend of his send-
ing important decision papers to the presi-
dent with the initials "OK S1\' was not true.
He explained the role which the president
had given him in the following manner:
"Eisenhower simply expected me to man-
age a staff that would simplify and expe-
dite the urgent business that had to be
brought to his personal attention and to
keep as much work of secondary impor-
tance as possible off his desk." The pa-
pers thatAdams did initial usually involved
minor patronage positions with which the
president had no desire to be involved and
which he approved in a routine manner.
With Adams making the patronage deci-
sions, the president realized that the dis-
appointed office seeker would vent his
anger at the Chief of Staff.
Eisenhower also used his Press Secre-
tary Jim Hagerty as a lightning rod as re-
counted humorously by Hagerty, himself:
President Eisenhower would say, "Do it
this way." Iwould say, "If! go to that press
conference and say what you want me to
say, I would get hell." With that he would
smile, get up and walk around the desk,
pat me on the back and say, "My boy, bet-
ter you than me."
In a very similar fashion, both contem-
poraries and some later historians have
seen animosity between Lincoln and Sec-
retary ofWar Stanton, despite the fact the
two men were actually on very intimate
terms. While some twentieth century
authors have raised preposterous charges
that Stanton hated Lincoln so much that
he engineered his death, during the last
two summers of the war the two shared
----------------
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adjoining cottages on the grounds of the
Soldier's Home. Here they enjoyed relax-
ing and playing with each other's children
with one of Stanton's son's most vivid
memories being of the president and his
father, dressed in formal clothing, climb-
ing a tree to rescue some pet peacocks that
had become entangled.
While a policy was under discussion
Stanton felt free to dissent vigorously, but
once an issue was decided, he would al-
ways yield to the president. On numer-
ous pieces of correspondence there ap-
pears the notation, "I yield to whatever the
President may think best for the service."
Stanton took the same sort of heat for
Lincoln as Eisenhower"s advisors did for
him with the two men having a working
relationship which complemented their
personalities. Stanton tended to be the
harsher of the two, although there were
times when he could be persuaded that
some kind deed, such as the release of a
prisoner should be accomplished, but that
he could not do so without weakening dis-
cipline and setting an unwise precedent.
In those cases Stanton was quick to send
the petitioners to Lincoln, who would par-
don the offending individual, thus keep-
ing Stanton's reputation as a tyrant intact,
and enhancing the president's kindly im-
age. Conversely, when Lincoln saw that
he could not take some kindly action, he
would dispatch the petitioners to Stanton
who would uphold the harsh action that
Lincoln wished taken. In each case
Stanton appeared to be the monster and
Lincoln the kindly father figure. Stanton
gladly deflected the anger away from Lin-
coln as Adams or Dulles did with
Eisenhower.
While a brief study cannot deal with
all policy areas, the manner in which the
presidents handled certain major issues is
instructive. One of the urgent problems
faced by Eisenhower was the demagogic
senator from Wisconsin, Joseph
McCarthy. McCarthy charged that the
government was riddled with Commu-
nists and he particularly criticized former
Secretary of State George C. Marshall, who,
he said, had lost China to the Communists.
Since Marshall had been Eisenhower's men-
tor and role model, he chafed at this criti-
cism, yet, rather than attacking McCarthy
in a direct manner, as Harry Truman would
certainly have done, Eisenhower proceeded
simply to ignore him.
While there has been some controversy
over the president's tactics, several inti-
mates believed they had been effective.
Eisenhower's Inaugural Portrait, 1956.
Speech writer Bryce Harlow wrote
"Truman attacked him (McCarthy) per~
sonally by name. Thereby he created a
monster. Eisenhower killed him and he
did it by ignoring him." William Ewald
who aided the president with his mem~
oirs, said the Eisenhower approach in
most cases of political attack amounted
to "...don't see, don't feel, don't admit, and
don't answer; just ignore your attacker and
keep smiling."
This approach had been developed in
his youth on advice from his mother
"Eventually, out of my mother's talk, gre~
my habit of not mentioning in public
anybody's name with whose actions or
words I took violent exception." He also
revealed an interesting device which he
used to try to disperse pent-up anger to-
ward someone who had offended him:
I used to follow a practice-somewhat
contrived I admit-to write the man's
name on a piece of scrap paper, drop it
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into the lowest drawer of my desk, and
say to myself: "That finishes the incident
and so far as I'm concerned, that fellow.';
Parenthetically, Lincoln also wrote
irate letters, one of the most famous be-
ing to General Meade after he let Lee get
away after Gettysburg. After his anger had
cooled, however, he did not forward it to
the general. It was annotated "To Gen.
Meade, never sent, or signed."
Lincoln and Eisenhower did use letter
writing to good effect on a variety of is-
sues. This was a more normal means of
communication for Lincoln in the nine-
teenth century but is more unique in the
case of Eisenhower, who actually disliked
using the telephone, which is, of course,
a more direct and confrontational means
of communication than a letter. On one
occasion, Ike actually sent letters to more
than four hundred businessmen friends
to solicit their support for his plan to re-
organize the Department of Defense.
One of Lincoln's major letter writing
campaigns involved his Reconstruction
policies in Louisiana. Rather than con-
front the issue of voting rights for blacks
directly, he worked behind the scenes
writing letters to Governor Michael Hah~
and other officials suggesting that intelli-
gent blacks and black soldiers should be
allowed to vote. The impact of a letter
from the president of the United States
upon the recipient can hardly be under-
estimated.
Another similarity is the two presi-
dents' use of language. While both men
could be precise when they wanted to be,
they also used language to conceal their
policies when it suited their purposes. At
press conferences, Eisenhower, who had
actually written speeches for General
McArthur, was a master of using fractured
syntax to confuse an issue. Before a press
conference on the Formosa Resolution he
told Press Secretary Jim Hagerty, "Don't
worry, Jim, if that question comes up, I'll
just confuse them." Years later he would
still chuckle about how hard it must have
been for the Russian and Chinese intelli-
gence agencies to explain to the heads of
their respective governments exactly what
the president had meant.
-----------------' ----------------
While Lincoln's use of evasive language
may not be as readily apparent, after all,
he was the author of the Gettysburg Ad-
dress and Second Inaugural, two of the
greatest addresses in the English lan-
guage, he could also tailor his writing
when it suited his purposes. One example
is the Emancipation Proclamation, which
contains none of the soaring rhetoric of
the Gettysburg Address, causing historian
Richard Hofstadter to write that it had "all
the grandeur of a bill of lading." The rea-
son for this, however, according to more
recent historians, was that in a matter so
controversial, Lincoln purposely did not
attempt to arouse the public.
Their styles and personalities also
marked something ofwhat might be con-
sidered the dark side of both men.
Eisenhower could use explosive profanity,
a trait perhaps not uncommon in career
military men, and he could often erupt in
anger. When speech writer Bryce Harlow
went in to recommend that the president
should invite Harry Truman to the White
House he told secretary Ann Whitman:
"You leave that door open so that when I
skid I won't hit the walL.I'm going to do
something to him that's going to infuri-
ate him, and Ijust want not to hit the wall
when I come out skidding."
Lincoln did use milder language than
Eisenhower but was also known when
annoyed to occasionally use profanity.
Francis Carpenter, who spent six months
at the White House and produced a paint-
ing of Lincoln signing the Emancipation
Proclamation surrounded by his cabinet,
described an officer who had been
cashiered from the service visiting the
White House and having the temerity to
say that Lincoln would not do him jus-
tice. Lincoln bolted from his chair and
grabbing the man by the collar exploded:
"Sir, I give you fair warning never to show
yourself in this room again." Historian
Michael Burlingame devotes a long chap-
ter in his recent book, The Inner World of
Abraham Lincoln, to what he calls
"Lincoln's Anger and Cruelty."
Each man, while being tolerant of the
indiscretions of those advisors who were
still useful to them, could also be ruthless
in dismissing those same loyal advisors
when they had become a liability. When
Sherman Adams became enmeshed in a
scandal over accepting gifts, Eisenhower
finally decided that Adams had to be fired.
He did not even tell Adams directly but
tasked Republican National Chairman
Meade Alcorn to wield the ax. Alcorn was
disturbed that he had to be the messen-
ger and since the.firing was done indirectly
Adams seemed to feel that his demise
came at the hands ofvice-president Nixon
and not the president himself.
Lincoln, who had long tolerated Trea-
sury Secretary Chase, also dismissed him
abruptly in the summer of 1864, when the
two clashed over an appointment to the
New York Custom House. Lincoln noti-
fied his Treasury Secretary that "relations
had reached a point of mutual embarrass-
ment" and Chase, who had offered to re-
sign several times before, was now some-
what surprised to discover that Lincoln
had accepted.
While sometimes being a bit devious
may be a trait that is admired in a chief
executive, or at least tolerated as a neces-
sary evil, a less generous interpretation
can be placed on the actions of
Eisenhower and Lincoln. One of the first
of the revisionist writers on Eisenhower,
Murray Kempton, portrayed Ike as devi-
ous as did Richard Nixon when he wrote,
"He was a far more complex and devious
man than most people realized, and in the
best sense of those words." Lincoln's law
partner, William Herndon, who admired
him greatly, nonetheless wrote, "He was
always calculating, always planning ahead.
His ambition was a little engine that knew
no rest."
There is also no suggestion that this
style was unique to these two chief execu-
tives. Thomas Jefferson is often seen as a
practitioner of the same style and a more
recent candidate would certainly be
Ronald Reagan. Further research would
undoubtedly verify that there are other
presidents who would fit into this category
as well.
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It should also be obvious that there
might be drawbacks to such a leadership
approach. Political Scientist, Richard
Neustadt has argued that a president's
success is directly dependent on those he
wishes to influence being aware of his poli-
cies and the potential punishments that
might come from not supporting them.
Therefore, if the president's hand is too
hidden, this can at times cause the very
appearance of drift and division within the
administration which the chief executive
is trying to avoid. While behind the scenes
he may have a firm hand on the helm, the
perception of indecision frustrates the
achievement of policy objectives.
Even historians who praise Lincoln
and Eisenhower as leaders admit that it is
not always a style they admire in more
recent practitioners. Indeed, the hidden
hand style does not guarantee success and
there is probably no one leadership style
which is appropriate for all situations.
Nonetheless, it was a style rooted in the
personalities and upbringing of Lincoln
and Eisenhower, which has caused Lin-
coln to be regarded as our best chief ex-
ecutive and Eisenhower as far above av-
erage. However, this secretive style has
made it much more difficult for both con-
temporaries and future generations of
scholars to decipher their true policies.
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